Uber RICO Lawsuit & Insurance Reform Strategy

Cost Control or Profit-Driven Tactics?

 

The company is pursuing an aggressive multi-front strategy to curb insurance payouts, but is it about cutting fraud or cutting compensation?

Uber Technologies, Inc. has launched an unprecedented campaign blending lawsuits, lobbying, and contract clauses to reshape its insurance liabilities. In recent months, Uber has filed racketeering (RICO) suits against personal injury lawyers and doctors, pushed legislation to drastically reduce coverage for accident victims, and enforced arbitration agreements to keep cases out of court. The company’s public message is that runaway insurance costs are hurting riders and drivers, so cracking down on “fraud” and lowering payouts will make rides more affordable. Critics, however, view a profit-driven smokescreen as a coordinated strategy to minimize Uber’s financial exposure at the expense of injured passengers’ rights. This article examines the evidence behind Uber’s legal and insurance maneuvers, analyzing the implications for accident victims and the personal injury bar. In conclusion, we consider whether Uber’s push is a legitimate cost-control effort or a cynical bid to boost profits and offer strategic guidance for injury firms.

RICO Lawsuits Targeting Personal Injury Claims

Uber has taken the offensive against what it calls “ringers” in the personal injury system by filing a series of civil RICO lawsuits in New York, Florida, and California. [1] In these suits, Uber accuses certain personal injury attorneys, medical clinics, and even its own drivers of orchestrating fraudulent car-accident schemes to inflate claim payouts. For example, a January 2025 federal complaint in Brooklyn alleged that law firms, doctors, and pain clinics conspired to stage “fake” collisions and perform unnecessary (sometimes invasive) treatments like spinal surgeries on Uber passengers, all to exploit New York’s generous no-fault insurance coverage.[2] In a June 2025 Florida filing, Uber claimed a network “staged car accidents, manufactured damages and [conducted] unnecessary medical procedures” on rideshare passengers in 2023–24, even bribing Uber drivers to collide on purpose, resulting in millions in bogus injury settlements.[3] And most recently, in California, Uber sued a Los Angeles law firm and chiropractors for allegedly referring Uber riders with minor fender-bender injuries to pre-selected clinics that ran up treatment bills as high as 10 times the norm, knowing that Uber’s $1 million per-ride insurance policy would pressure them into large settlements. [4]

Uber frames these RICO actions as consumer-protection: a necessary crackdown on fraud rings that drives up insurance costs for everyone. “Consumers ultimately are paying for fraudulent activity,” Uber’s head of policy stated, “so we have an obligation to…stop it, including pursuing civil RICO suits.” [5] By recovering millions paid out in dubious claims, Uber says it can deter bad actors and keep insurance expenses (and fares) in check. Notably, the California complaint explicitly ties the alleged fraud to the state’s high insurance limits, accusing lawyers of milking the $1 million mandatory coverage to “fraudulently induce significantly larger settlement payments.” [6]

In response, the targeted injury firms vigorously deny Uber’s allegations and suggest a very different motive. One defendant, Downtown LA Law Group, blasted Uber’s lawsuit as a baseless attempt to “suppress legitimate injury claims” by scaring off plaintiffs and their lawyers. [7] The firm pointed out that Uber “never tried a single case it now claims was fraudulent”, instead settling those injury claims for payment, a sign that the claims had merit, or at least that Uber preferred quiet payouts over airing these issues in court. [8] From the perspective of the plaintiffs’ bar, Uber’s RICO suits look less like targeted anti-fraud efforts and more like a strategic intimidation campaign: painting contingency-fee lawyers as racketeers to chill them from aggressively pursuing high-dollar claims. Indeed, Uber has made clear that deterring personal injury attorneys is part of the goal. In a multimillion-dollar ad campaign early this year, Uber frankly said that lowering insurance payouts would “help deter personal injury lawyers from taking advantage of lucrative [insurance] policies and seeking high payouts.” [9] This rare admission lays bare Uber’s broader agenda, not just rooting out a few “bad apples,” but changing the economic calculus for all injury claims against it.

Lobbying to Slash Insurance Coverage

(Uber backs SB 371)

Parallel to its courtroom offensive, Uber is lobbying hard to rewrite the rules of the road, literally changing the amount of insurance coverage victims can access. Nowhere is this more stark than in California Senate Bill 371, a 2025 proposal that Uber strongly supports to reduce the coverage required for rideshare insurance drastically. Under current California law, when an Uber driver is at fault or an uninsured driver hits an Uber passenger, the Uber network must provide at least $1 million in uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage to cover the injuries. SB 371 would slash that to just $50,000 per person (and $100,000 per incident), a 95% drop in protection for each injured rider.[10] In practical terms, this means an Uber passenger who suffers catastrophic injuries from a crash could see available compensation plummet from up to $1 million down to a maximum of $50k (regardless of actual medical costs or losses).

Uber’s Director of Policy, Ramona Prieto, testified “strong support” for SB 371 in Sacramento, [11] aligning Uber with the bill’s author and industry allies. The company also poured six figures into public ads in California touting the need for “insurance reform.” [12] Uber argues that such measures will right-size insurance costs and prevent abuse: the narrative is that excessive insurance mandates (like the $1M UM coverage) have been “exploited” by lawyers to seek windfall payouts, so dialing them back will remove the incentive for fraud and ultimately lower premiums and fares.[13] Not coincidentally, Lyft and other gig-platform companies have echoed support for scaling down coverage limits in tandem with Uber. [14]

If this playbook sounds familiar, it’s because Uber has seen success elsewhere. In New York City, Uber-backed legislation (passed in June 2025) slashed required no-fault personal injury protection (PIP) coverage for ride-hail vehicles. [15] And Uber’s lobbying extends nationwide: the company has joined coalitions like “Citizens for Affordable Rates” and “Protecting American Consumers” (alongside unlikely allies such as Waffle House) to push similar rollbacks of insurance requirements in states like New York, Georgia, and Nevada. [16] The multistate campaign is backed by at least $10 million in advocacy spending this year alone. Uber’s ads warn that “insurance costs” are driving up fares and urge consumers to support laws to “keep rides affordable,” [17] effectively recruiting riders to side with Uber in reducing the insurance safety nets that those very riders might one day need after an accident.

What’s notably absent from Uber’s public talking points is the flip side of whose costs are being cut. Reducing an injured passenger’s UM coverage from $1,000,000 to $50,000 saves money for Uber and its insurers; the question is at whose expense. SB 371’s committee analysis points out that the intent is for any savings to be “reinvested” to benefit drivers and riders, an acknowledgment that otherwise the windfall might be used to pad corporate profits. [18] In other words, lawmakers recognize the risk that lower payouts for claims could mean a financial boon for Uber, rather than meaningfully lower prices for consumers. This tension, between Uber’s cost-cutting and the public interest, is at the heart of the debate.

Forced Arbitration: Severely Injured and Shut Out of Court

Another pillar of Uber’s liability strategy is its mandatory arbitration policy, buried in the fine print of its user terms. Virtually every Uber rider (and driver) is bound by a dense “clickwrap” agreement waiving the right to sue in court for any claims arising from the service, funneling disputes into private arbitration. Uber has aggressively enforced this arbitration clause, even in cases involving harrowing injuries, effectively shielding itself from jury trials and large verdicts. A striking example came from New Jersey: in McGinty v. Uber, a husband and wife were severely injured when their Uber driver ran a red light and t-boned another car, causing life-altering spinal, abdominal, and arm injuries.[19] When the couple sued Uber for their medical bills and losses, Uber moved to compel arbitration and won on appeal.

In October 2024, a NJ appellate court ruled that the McGintys “cannot sue Uber” in court at all, because months before the crash, their teenage daughter had used her mother’s Uber Eats app and clicked “I agree” to Uber’s updated terms (which included an arbitration clause). [20] That single click, even by a minor, was held to bind the entire family to resolve any injury claims privately, outside of court. [21] The trial judge had initially refused to enforce the clause, finding Uber’s app did not clearly alert users they were waiving a jury trial. [22] But Uber’s lawyers persisted, and the higher court dutifully cited pro-arbitration policy, ultimately holding that “magic words are not required” as long as the clause implies disputes won’t go to court. [23] The upshot: despite suffering catastrophic injuries due to an Uber driver’s negligence (the driver blew through a red light), the McGintys are barred from presenting their case to any judge or jury. Instead, they must plead their case in a closed arbitration proceeding administered by a private arbitrator (often viewed as more business-friendly), with limited discovery and no public record.

This case is no outlier. Uber has fought to send countless injury claims to arbitration, from assault victims to crash survivors. In late 2024, New York’s highest court also upheld Uber’s arbitration mandate in an injury case, despite the lawsuit being filed before Uber’s terms were updated, citing the company’s standard user agreement as overriding the court's. [24] The broad scope of Uber’s terms means that even non-riders can be roped in. As the NJ case showed, a family member’s use of the app can waive others’ rights, and even seemingly unrelated services (Uber Eats food delivery) are tied into the same arbitration agreement covering ride accidents. [25] Corporations like Uber favor arbitration because it minimizes their exposure; damages awards tend to be lower than jury verdicts, there’s no risk of a publicized multi-million-dollar award (proceedings are confidential), and importantly, no class actions are allowed.

For injured individuals, however, the arbitration trap can be devastating. Without the leverage of a jury trial, severely injured riders have little bargaining power. It’s telling that when another major company, Disney, tried a similar tactic, arguing an arbitration clause in a Disney+ streaming subscription should block a wrongful death lawsuit by a man whose wife died at a Disney resort, the resulting public outrage forced Disney to back down and waive arbitration.[26] Uber has faced no comparable shame; its arbitration terms remain in force, quietly barring an untold number of victims from ever seeing a courtroom. This preemptive strike on the civil justice system is a cornerstone of Uber’s risk management. Regardless of the severity of the injury, Uber seeks to keep the dispute out of the public eye and out of the hands of local juries.

Rising Insurance Costs: Uber’s Public Narrative vs. Financial Reality

From Uber’s perspective, all these efforts, RICO suits, lobbying, and arbitration tie back to a common justification: controlling skyrocketing insurance costs. Uber argues that it has been hit with exponential increases in insurance premiums and claim payouts, which ultimately get passed on to riders and drivers in the form of higher fares and lower earnings. The company’s CEO, Dara Khosrowshahi, warned in late 2024 of a slowdown in Uber’s U.S. rideshare usage, explicitly citing “higher [insurance] costs the company passed on to consumers.” [27] According to Uber, insurance now comprises as much as 32% of fares in California (and up to 45% in particularly litigious markets like Los Angeles). [28] Uber’s own data on its new advocacy website claimed that insurance costs per trip have increased by ~50% over the past three years. [29] In Uber’s telling, this trend is unsustainable: unless insurance losses are reined in, ride-share prices will continue to climb and drivers’ take-home pay will suffer, threatening the viability of the entire service.

There is truth to Uber’s predicament; commercial auto insurance rates have risen sharply in recent years, industry-wide, and a $ 1 million policy per incident (the coverage Uber must carry in many states) is expensive. What’s contentious is Uber’s implication that injured victims and their attorneys are chiefly to blame, and that cutting back their compensation is the solution. Uber’s messaging consistently points the finger at personal injury lawyers, medical providers, and a “broken legal system.” In a typical statement, Uber’s head of public policy railed that the system allows “personal injury lawyers and a shady network” of doctors, chiropractors, and even litigation funders “to exploit rideshare insurance mandates for financial gain.” [30] Uber argues that by lowering mandatory coverage limits (the “mandates”) and aggressively challenging suspicious claims, it will remove these alleged profit incentives and thereby reduce costs for everyone. In short, Uber presents itself as standing up for “affordable rides” for consumers against an insurance system that it alleges is being gamed by others.

Critics, however, question this narrative, warning that Uber’s reforms primarily benefit the Company Itself. First, while Uber highlights the most egregious examples of fraud, the vast majority of injury claims are legitimate accidents suffered by ordinary passengers or drivers. Slashing coverage across the board doesn’t just deter fake claims, it more so limits payouts on real ones. A severely injured person’s claim isn’t suddenly less costly just because the law caps what they can recover; instead, the unrecovered losses get shifted to the victim, their health insurance, or taxpayers. Uber and its insurers, meanwhile, simply pay out less per claim, improving their bottom line. Indeed, industry experience suggests that when claims drop, corporate coffers swell. A telling example arose during the COVID-19 pandemic: with far fewer cars on the road, auto insurers enjoyed a windfall from dramatically reduced accident claims. State Farm, the largest U.S. auto insurer, reported “better than anticipated claim results” in 2020 and ended up refunding $400 million to California policyholders, because regulators found insurers were effectively overcharging drivers given the dip in claims. [31] In other words, when payouts fell, profits rose beyond reasonable levels. It took regulatory prodding to get that excess returned to consumers.

Uber is not an insurance company per se, but the principle is the same: if Uber succeeds in reducing claim payouts (through lower coverage limits or discouraging claims), there is no automatic mechanism to ensure those savings are passed on to riders or drivers. In fact, California’s SB 371 had to insert language about reinvesting savings in driver welfare, but it provides no concrete formula or enforcement; it’s essentially a hope, not a guarantee. [32] Uber’s track record on passing on cost savings is mixed. (For instance, when Uber lobbied to keep drivers as independent contractors, it promised driver flexibility and lower costs to riders; drivers did get some perks via Proposition 22, but much of the labor cost savings went to Uber’s margins and stock price.) Given Uber’s duty to shareholders, one might cynically predict that any significant reduction in insurance expenses would largely “enhance corporate earnings” unless market competition forces fares down.

Furthermore, Uber’s portrayal of a “broken” legal system overlooks that insurance exists to pay for injuries in the first place. The $1 million coverage requirement for rideshare was instituted because lawmakers recognized the unique risks of the industry, transporting paying passengers, and the potential for severe injuries. Uber treats that coverage as a honey pot for unscrupulous lawyers, but for an accident victim paralyzed or brain-injured in a crash, that insurance can be a lifeline (for medical care, lost income, etc.). Uber’s own California lawsuit inadvertently proves this point: it cited a scenario where a medical bill was “10 times more than the norm” for a minor injury, [33] which is presented as outrageous. However, consider a case of a major injury, where medical bills can be 100 times the norm. In such cases, even the full $1 million may not be sufficient. Reducing coverage to $50,000 would mean those victims are virtually guaranteed to be under-compensated. That shortfall doesn’t make the costs disappear; it simply externalizes them onto someone else.

Finally, Uber’s assertion that personal injury lawyers are exploiting high limits for “high payouts” omits the reality that lawyers only recover large payouts when their clients have suffered large harms. Contingency-fee attorneys typically invest considerable time and money into serious injury cases (paying for expert witnesses, accident reconstruction, etc.), and they only get paid if they win or settle. The contingency fee system, despite its flaws, is what enables working-class and low-income individuals to afford legal representation in these situations, a point even academic research supports. A recent law review study of New York injury claims found that contingent fees have largely solved the access-to-justice problem in tort litigation: people in poorer neighborhoods file and recover on personal injury claims at similar or higher rates than wealthier people, precisely because they can hire lawyers without upfront costs and pay via a percentage of recovery. [34] In other words, without sizable insurance payouts and contingency arrangements, most ordinary people would have no viable way to pursue their claims at all. By seeking to “deter” lawyers from taking cases (as Uber’s ads boast) through lowering the potential recovery, Uber is, in effect, deterring injured individuals from seeking redress, because if no lawyer will take your case, your rights are meaningless.

Implications for Injury Victims and Personal Injury

Uber’s coordinated strategy, if successful, could profoundly shift the legal playing field in favor of accident victims and the attorneys who represent them. Consider the cumulative effect of what’s been described:

1. DRASTICALLY LOWER INSURANCE LIMITS

Victims of crashes involving Uber, whether as passengers, pedestrians, or other drivers, would face far lower caps on recovery. A family hit by an Uber vehicle, or an Uber passenger injured by an uninsured third party, might find only $50,000 (or even less in some states) available, where today $1,000,000 exists. For serious injuries, this means victims will be left paying the majority of their medical bills and losses out-of-pocket or via taxpayer-funded programs. Many injury attorneys cannot afford to take cases where the damages far exceed the available insurance, because even a win will not generate enough to cover litigation costs and a reasonable fee. Thus, many meritorious cases will go unrepresented, especially those of lower-income individuals without other resources.

2. ARBITRATION AND SUPPRESSED LAWSUITS

Even when a claim is pursued, Uber’s arbitration clause keeps it out of the public eye and prevents it from being part of collective proceedings. Injured parties are often isolated in one-on-one arbitrations, which frequently feature limited discovery, no right to appeal, and comparatively small awards. Crucially, no jury of peers will ever hear these cases, and thus the community loses its voice in setting standards for safety. The deterrent effect of a potentially large jury verdict is exactly what pushes corporations to improve safety; by removing that, Uber reduces its incentive to avoid accidents or misconduct.  Arbitration also means that cases are less economically viable, with a lower potential payout and higher procedural hurdles, which again dissuades lawyers from taking on cases. Over time, Uber’s forced arbitration could create a chilling effect, where only a small subset of specialized firms handles Uber injury claims, and many victims give up.

3. THREAT OF RETALIATION AGAINST LAWYERS 

Uber’s willingness to sue plaintiff attorneys and doctors for fraud (under RICO), even after Uber itself chose to settle the underlying cases, sends a message to the plaintiff lawyers: proceed at your peril. While blatant fraud should be punished, the fear is that Uber might label ordinary advocacy or aggressive medical treatment as “fraudulent” after the fact. A lawyer who knows that pushing for a high settlement could result in being personally sued by a deep-pocketed corporation may think twice, especially if their firm doesn’t have the resources to fight a protracted RICO case. This asymmetry (a global tech company turning its legal firepower on small contingency firms) could intimidate less-established injury attorneys from ever taking on Uber claims. In turn, this reduces competition and options for injured clients, exactly what Uber (by its own admission) aims to achieve by deterring lawyers from seeking high payouts. [35]

4. EROSION OF CONTINGENCY JUSTICE

Ultimately, Uber’s insurance reform push threatens to unravel the contingency-fee model that has long been a cornerstone of civil justice for everyday Americans. Contingency fees work when there is a reasonable expectation of adequate recovery. If that expectation is removed (e.g., if maximum damages are arbitrarily capped far below actual losses) then contingency arrangements no longer make economic sense in many cases. Plaintiffs’ lawyers might have to turn away clients (especially the most severely injured, ironically, since their cases are costly to develop) or focus only on clear-liability, modest-damages cases that can be resolved quickly. The net result is a justice gap where working-class and poor individuals, who can’t afford hourly attorneys, will be left with no representation for serious claims. This reverses decades of progress. As one study showed, because of contingent fees, poorer people have been able to “seek and achieve legal redress at a rate comparable to that of the wealthy,” even in personal injury cases.[36] If companies like Uber succeed in undercutting the value of those cases, that hard-won access to justice will shrink. Injured victims with legitimate claims may quietly absorb their losses or rely on overstretched legal aid/government programs because no private attorney can justify taking the case.

5. PROFIT OVER SAFETY CONCERNS

There’s also a broader public safety implication. If reducing insurance costs becomes simply a matter of reducing payouts (rather than reducing accidents), the incentive to make rides safer could diminish. A large insurance payout or verdict not only compensates the victim but also sends a market signal about the cost of unsafe practices. Uber’s initiatives, while perhaps rooted in valid frustrations about insurance inefficiencies, largely focus on managing payouts rather than preventing the underlying harm. One worry is that by capping its exposure and muting legal consequences, Uber could become less vigilant about who it permits to drive, how vehicles are maintained, or other safety measures. When the downside is limited (and bad incidents are quietly arbitrated), shareholders may prefer cost-cutting over safety investments. That would be a dangerous development for the riding public.

In sum, Uber’s coordinated legal-insurance strategy threatens to redistribute risk and cost from the company to the very parties the civil justice system is meant to protect injury victims and the lawyers who serve them. It exemplifies a larger trend among platform companies to offload legal liabilities, whether by reclassifying workers, imposing one-sided contracts, or lobbying for special laws, a trend likely to continue as the gig economy evolves. As insurance analysts forecast, by 2035, we may see more “on-demand” and embedded micro-insurance models [37] in platform businesses, which could further compartmentalize and limit consumer claims. Uber’s current push may be a harbinger of that future: a world where big companies tightly control their exposure, and individuals bear more of the risk associated with the activities they participate in.

Strategies for Injury Firms

Is Uber’s insurance reform drive a bona fide effort to curb fraud and lower costs for the common good, or a cynical ploy to pad profits at the expense of the injured? The evidence reviewed leans heavily in favor of the latter. Uber’s moves, slashing coverage, mandating arbitration, suing opposing lawyers, appear aimed less at eliminating fraud (which could be addressed in narrower ways) and more at eliminating large payouts, period. It’s a classic example of a corporation seeking to socialize risk (make others bear it) and privatize profit. While Uber and its allies understandably want to reduce expenses, doing so by stripping away victims’ rights and compensation is a questionable trade-off from a public policy standpoint. Limiting insurance might lower Uber’s operating costs, but it doesn’t prevent accidents or fraud; it mainly ensures that when people are hurt, Uber pays out less.

For personal injury attorneys and firms, especially those working on a contingency basis, Uber’s strategy is a wake-up call and a call to arms. Access to justice for injured clients is under threat and defending it will require savvy and concerted effort. Here are key steps and strategies for injury firms in this environment:

1. STAY INFORMED & ENGAGE LEGISLATORS

Plaintiff lawyers must closely track legislation like SB 371 and its analogues in other states. These bills can move fast under heavy lobbying. It’s critical to educate lawmakers on how such drastic reductions in coverage will harm constituents (their voters) who are accident victims. Injury firms should consider banding together through state trial lawyer associations (e.g., CAOC, AAJ) to present data and stories that counter Uber’s narrative. Often, a single sympathetic example, “Imagine an Uber hits your child and there’s only $50k to cover a $500k hospital bill,” can change a legislator’s perspective. Don’t concede the “affordability” argument without highlighting the human cost of slashing insurance.

2. PUBLIC AWARENESS & NARRATIVE

Uber has spent millions controlling the narrative (e.g., “insurance = higher fares”). Injury firms need to speak up in the media and on platforms like LinkedIn to provide balance. Emphasize that insurance payouts go to real people with real injuries and that forcing those payouts down shifts costs to families and society. If Uber spotlights fraud, point out that fraud can and should be prosecuted without gutting everyone’s coverage (the answer is better enforcement, not denying coverage to honest victims). By raising public awareness, lawyers can help mitigate Uber’s lobbying influence, and lawmakers will be more likely to listen to public opinion, especially if voters start questioning whether this is really about corporate profits. Consider publishing op-eds, soliciting client testimonials, or partnering with consumer advocacy groups to effectively convey the message.

3. FORTIFY CASE STRATEGIES

In handling existing and future Uber-related cases, lawyers should assume Uber will scrutinize claims for any hint of exaggeration. Thus, it’s wise to proactively counter the “fraud” narrative: document injuries and treatments meticulously, use reputable, independent medical experts when possible, and avoid any providers with even a whiff of impropriety. By keeping cases above reproach, firms can better withstand Uber’s aggressive defense tactics and reduce the chance of being targeted in a later RICO action. It may also be prudent to diversify the legal theories in major cases, for instance, by including any potential product liability or premises liability angles (e.g., if a vehicle defect or unsafe pickup location contributed to the harm), to avoid relying solely on the auto insurance claim that Uber is aiming to cap. Creativity in legal strategy can sometimes find alternative or additional recovery sources that bypass Uber’s roadblocks.

4. PREPARE FOR ARBITRATION (or try to avoid it)

Given that most claims against Uber will likely be pushed into arbitration, firms should develop playbooks to maximize outcomes in that forum. Research arbitrator track records, insist on a fair arbitrator selection process, and don’t shy away from demanding that arbitration fees be paid by Uber (as required by many consumer arbitration rules). In egregious cases, firms can attempt to challenge the enforceability of arbitration (for example, if a client truly never received reasonable notice of the terms); however, courts are generally enforcement-friendly following Epic Systems and similar rulings. At a minimum, ensure that clients understand the arbitration clause; some jurisdictions allow individuals to opt out of arbitration within a short window of accepting the terms (Uber’s contracts have had opt-out clauses in the past, although they may be buried). If so, advise clients to opt out in writing, so you preserve their court rights. While this is a long-shot solution (few people read the fine print in time), it’s worth incorporating into client education when you onboard a case.

5. COLLABORATE AND SHARE INFORMATION

Uber’s legal salvo, especially the RICO suits, is a relatively new tactic. Plaintiff firms should not operate in silos when faced with these. If Uber sues one firm or insinuates fraud, the broader community needs to close ranks, share insights, and perhaps coordinate a unified defense or PR response. Uber’s resources might outgun a lone firm. Still, a coalition (with support from trial lawyer associations) can pool evidence of Uber’s practices and possibly find inconsistencies or overreach in Uber’s allegations. RICO cases also have a high bar (requiring proof of an “enterprise” and pattern of predicate crimes like fraud), so a concerted effort can be made to show the court that Uber’s claims are not meeting the standard but are instead retaliatory. There may even be legislative fixes to propose (e.g., strengthening anti-SLAPP laws or enacting penalties for frivolous RICO suits against lawful claimants). These are conversations that injury firms should be having together.

6. LEVERAGE EXPERTS AND CONSULTANTS

Finally, don’t hesitate to seek outside help. The intersection of insurance law, public relations, and legislative advocacy is a complex area. This is where consulting with experts like Vega & Company (VGNCO) can provide a significant competitive advantage. VGNCO specializes in guiding law firms through industry upheavals, from analyzing how new insurance laws will impact case inventories to developing messaging that resonates with both legal and lay audiences. Vega & Company can assist in formulating lobbying strategies, connecting firms with key policymakers, and crafting a resilient business plan for personal injury practices in the face of changing insurance dynamics. For example, if UM coverage is slashed, VGNCO can advise on alternate insurance products or legal theories to pursue so that firms can still recover adequate damages for clients (ensuring the firm’s financial viability as well). In an era where Insurtech and platform economics are rapidly evolving, having a knowledgeable advisor is invaluable.

Moving Forward

Injury attorneys and firms must not remain passive as Uber and others attempt to rewrite the rules. We encourage firms to take the steps above to protect both their clients and their practice. Most importantly, don’t go at it alone. Now is the time to consult with industry experts like Vega & Company (VGNCO), who can help craft a strategic response to Uber’s moves, whether it’s lobbying guidance, case strategy optimization, or public communications. By standing together and leveraging expert counsel, the plaintiff’s bar can push back against overreach, ensuring that cost control does not come at the unconscionable cost of justice denied.

Written by:

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Written by: Fernando Vega

CEO & Founder | Chief Strategy Officer

Vega & Company (VGNCO)

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[1] See, e.g., Natalie Lung, Uber Alleges Inflated Injury Bills in Los Angeles Insurance Fraud Lawsuit, Insurance Journal (July 21, 2025) (reporting on Uber’s third fraud lawsuit of 2025, after similar cases in New York and Florida).

[2] L. Nahmias, N. Yung, Uber Alleges Fraud Scheme by New York Groups Faking Car-Crash Injuries, Bloomberg (January 30, 2025).

[3] Natalie Lung, Uber Alleges Insurance Fraud Scheme in Florida as It Goes on Legal Offensive, Insurance Journal (June 11, 2025).

[4] Supra at n. 1.

[5] Supra at n. 3.

[6] Supra at n. 1.

[7] Id.

[8] Supra at n. 1.

[9] Natalie Lung, Uber Targets Personal Injury Lawyers in Multimillion Dollar Ad Campaign, Insurance Journal (February 18, 2025).

[10] SB 371, 2025–26 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2025) (as amended June 30, 2025) (proposing to reduce required uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage for transportation network companies from $1,000,000 to $50,000 per person / $100,000 per incident).

[11] Supra at n. 1. 

[12] Id.

[13] Supra at n. 9.

[14] Supra at n. 1.

[15] Supra at n. 1.

[16] Supra at n. 9.

[17] Id.

[18] Cal. Senate Comm. on Comm. & Conveyance, Analysis of SB 371 (July 16, 2025) at 1–2 (noting the bill’s stated intent that “financial savings” from reduced insurance expenditures be reinvested to benefit drivers and riders, and requiring reporting on insurance impacts)

[19] Andrew Simpson, Couple Seriously Injured in Uber Crash Blocked From Court by Uber Eats Terms, Insurance Journal (October 7, 2024). 

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Andrew Simpson, New York High Court Upholds Uber Arbitration Mandate For Previously-Filed Injury Case, Insurance Journal (November 26, 2024).

[25] Supra at n. 19.

[26] Id.

[27] Supra at n. 9.

[28] Supra at n. 1.

[29] Supra at n. 9.

[30] Supra at n. 1.

[31] State Farm Returning $400M to California Auto Customers, Insurance Journal (March 22, 2021).

[32] Cal. Senate Comm. on Comm. & Conveyance, Analysis of SB 371 (July 16, 2025) at 1–2 (noting the bill’s stated intent that “financial savings” from reduced insurance expenditures be reinvested to benefit drivers and riders, and requiring reporting on insurance impacts).

[33] Supra at n. 1.

[34] Eric Helland & Daniel Klerman, Contingent Fees and Access to Justice, 102 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1319, 1321–22 (2024) (finding that contingent fee arrangements have “at least partly solved the access-to-justice problem in tort litigation,” with residents of poorer zip codes filing and winning personal injury claims at rates equal or higher to wealthier residents, due in large part to the availability of contingency-fee lawyers).

[35] Supra at n. 9.

[36] Supra at n. 34.

[37] Supra at n. 32.